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Abstract: A significant number of scholars have written about the nexus
between fairness in the allocation of taxing rights in double taxation treaties
and sustainable development in developing countries. These scholars have
argued for expansive taxing rights for developing countries, as against the
current source- restricting provisions in taxation treaties between developed
and developing countries based on the OECD and UN Model taxation treaties.
They have also highlighted the need for developing countries to critically
assess their treaty networks, and to consider gaps in their local laws and
policies that encourage revenue loss. This paper contributes to this body of
knowledge by identifying provisions in Nigeria’s double taxation treaties that
encourage revenue loss. It concludes by recommending amendments to
Nigeria’s double taxation treaties.
Keywords: international taxation, double taxation treaties, source countries,
residence countries, inter-nation equity
One of the important issues for international taxation is to effect a division of revenue
between two countries where income sourced in one country is derived by a resident of
the other country. This division has equity consequences as between nations. If invest-
ment and income flows are in balance between two countries, it is possible to achieve a
fair division of tax revenue by giving greater emphasis to exclusive residence country
taxation. If the flows are not in balance, it is necessary to agree to a balance between
residence and source taxation to achieve a division of revenue that is acceptable (and
fair) to both countries.1
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1 Richard J. Vann, “Current Trends in Balancing Residence and Source Taxation” (2014) Sydney
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/107 1 at 8. Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2538269>.
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1 Introduction
Transnational business activities by multinational corporations (MNCs) necessi-
tate the harmonization of the taxation rules of states usually for the following
reasons: prevention of international double taxation,2 “encouraging cross-bor-
der economic activity, preventing international tax avoidance and evasion, and
more generally, strengthening political ties with the partner country”.3 This
harmonization takes the form of double tax treaties between states, which are
now about two thousand and six hundred in number.4
Double tax treaties are international agreements between states, binding on
states under the honoured pacta sunt servanda customary rule of international
law.5 Nearly all double taxation treaties are mirrored in line with the OECD
Model Double Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 20176 (the OECD Model)
and the UN Model Double Taxation Treaty between Developed and Developing
Countries, 20177 (the UN Model). These two conventions serve as model treaties
containing common terms, including the rules governing allocation and exercise
of taxing rights by states. The rules divide taxing rights with respect to profits
derived by MNCs from their cross-border activities between states as “source”
and “residence” states, respectively. These rules can be traced to the report of
four economists, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp,
who formed the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations in 1923.8 They were
developed by the League of Nations (the League) as mechanisms for the pre-
vention of double taxation of MNCs, a practice which characterized the taxation
of the cross-border activities of MNCs by developed countries.9 On its part, the
OECD formally adopted and modified these rules in 1977 to serve as a template
for double tax treaties between developed and developing countries.
2 Michael Lang, Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Conventions (2013) IBFD, at 30.
3 Julia Braun and Martin Zagler, An Economic Perspective on Double Tax Treaties with (in)
Developing Countries, World Tax Journal (2014), 242 at 243.
4 Ibid.
5 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969). See also Klaus Vogel,
Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 International Tax & Business Lawyer (1986), 1.
6 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (OECD
Publishing, 2017).
7 United Nations, Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing
Countries (2017).
8 See Sol Picciotto, International Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of
Business Regulation (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992) for the historical background of
double taxation treaties.
9 Ibid.
194 O. A. Eyitayo-Oyesode Law and Development Review
The UN published the Model Double Taxation Convention in 1980 when it
observed that past model tax conventions, including the OECD Model, failed to
facilitate bilateral treaties between developed and developing countries. The UN
noted that allocation rules in these past models favoured residence countries
more than source countries.10 The UN Model relied on the provisions of the
OECD Model but modified it by relinquishing more taxing rights to source
countries, different from the provisions of the OECD Model which favoured
residence countries.11
Considering the divergence in the rules contained in the OECD and the UN
Models regarding the exercise of taxing rights by source countries, this paper
assesses the implications of the restrictive source-based taxing rights under the
OECD Model. It also examines the impact of the expansive source-based taxing
rights under the UN Model using Canada’s Double Taxation Treaty with Nigeria
as a case study.
The discussion is divided into five sections. Section 1, this Introduction,
briefly sets out the theme of discussion and the line of argument pursued.
Section 2 gives a historical account of the evolution of the current rules governing
the exercise of source-based taxing rights under the OECD Model. The aim is to
assess the context within which these rules emerged as tools adopted by the
League12 to harmonize unilateral taxation laws of developed countries for the
prevention of double taxation. Section 3 assesses in detail the allocation rules
under Articles 7–13 of the OECD Model. This section analyses the text of these
rules, as well as the commentary on those rules, to establish the unfairness of the
rules against source countries, especially where investment and income flows
between source and resident countries are unbalanced. This section discusses the
inadequacies of the rules in the context of the inter-nation equity principle,13 as
well as economic reasons why the restriction of source-based taxing rights under
10 See supra note 7, at vi–x. See also Alexander J. Easson, The Evolution of Canada’s Tax Treaty
Policy Since the Royal Commission on Taxation, 26 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (1986), 495; Kim
Brooks, “Canada’s Evolving Tax Treaty Policy in Globalization and its tax Discontents”, in
Arthur J. Cockfield (ed.), Globalization and Its Tax Discontents: Tax Policy and International
Investments (Toronto: London: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfied Policies, 26
Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2001), 1357 for a detailed discussion of the restrictive
taxing rights under the OECD Model and the modification to those under the UN Model.
11 Ibid.
12 The League of Nations’ work in harmonizing taxation laws of states preceded that of the
OECD. The League functioned in this regard from 1923 till 1954 when it became defunct.
13 In the context of this paper “Inter-nation Equity” means the “equitable division of the tax
revenue between countries”: see Peggy Musgrave, United Taxation of Foreign Investment
Income: Issues and Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1969) at 131. See also Alex J.
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the OECD Model is unjustifiable. As an alternative to the restrictive source-based
taxing right under the OECD Model, Section 4 examines the source-expanding
provisions under Canada’s Double Taxation Treaty with Nigeria which mirrors the
UN Model. Although the UN Model expands source-based taxing rights, the
argument made in Section 5 of this paper is that the UN Model only varies slightly
from the OECD Model. This section also discusses the minimal impact that source-
expansive rules in the Canada-Nigeria treaty has on Nigeria’s economy due to the
low foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from Canada to Nigeria. Altogether,
this paper concludes by recommending the assessment and reform of Nigeria’s tax
treaties, whether based on the OECD Model or on the UN Model, to ensure that
economic activities carried on by non-residents within the country are fully taxed.
2 Source-Based Taxing Rights under the OECD
Model
2.1 The League of Nations and Tax Law Harmonization
The current rules in the OECD Model which allocate taxing rights between
source and residence countries, come from the report by the Fiscal Committee
of the League in the 1920s. The rules were intended to serve as mechanisms to
balance the taxation of the profits of MNCs by developed states for the preven-
tion of double taxation.14 The League’s effort to balance the taxation laws of
Easson, International Tax Reform and the Inter-Nation Allocation of Tax Revenue (Wellington,
NZ: Victoria University Press, 1991); Jinyan Li, “Improving Inter-Nation Equity”, in Arthur
Cockfield (eds.), Globalization and its Tax Discontents: Tax Policies and International
Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), pp.
117–137; Nancy B. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 Law & Pol’y
Int’l Bus (1997–1998), 145, 145 but see Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an
Important but Underappreciated International Tax Value” (October 30, 2008), Tax Reform in the
twenty-first Century, Richard Krever and John G. Head (eds.), Kluwer Law International,
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: www.ssrn.com/abstract=1292370 where Brooks reviewed
Peggy and Richard Musgrave’s 1972 essay entitled “Inter-nation equity” in Richard M. Bird
and G. Head (eds.), Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1972) as well as subsequent works of Peggy Musgrave on the subject and
defined “Inter-Nation Equity” as “the allocation of national gain, which is affected by the source
country’s decision to tax (or not) the gain (or loss)”.
14 Mitchell B. Carroll, Global Perspectives of an International Tax Lawyer (Hicksville: New York:
Exposition Press, 1978) at 29; see also Picciotto supra note 8, at 22–23.
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states began in the interwar years.15 During this period, investment flowed from
capital-exporting states (predominantly the US and Britain) to capital-importing
states. The disagreement in the fiscal laws of capital-exporting countries and
capital-importing countries needed to be harmonized to prevent MNCs from
being doubly taxed in source countries (importing countries) and their home/
resident countries (exporting countries) which would ultimately hinder interna-
tional trade. For instance, Britain, a capital-exporting state, felt strongly about
retaining its worldwide taxing rights over its residents wherever those residents
earn their income, while France, a capital-importing state, levied tax on busi-
ness profits as well as profits earned on securities derived by both domestic and
foreign corporations in France.16 The possibility of an MNC being doubly taxed
exists under this circumstance if France were to levy income tax on profits
derived within its jurisdiction by a Britain-resident corporation. This is one
reason the allocation rules were developed by the League in 1928 through its
model taxation treaty to divide taxing rights among developed countries.17
Consequently, a source country could only tax the profits of a non-resident
enterprise derived from business activities carried on by such an enterprise
within its jurisdiction if the enterprise had a permanent establishment, that is,
a fixed place of business in the source country. On the other hand, resident
corporations given residual taxing rights over the business profits of their
residents subject to the existence of a foreign tax credit mechanism (FTC)
which served as an offset to foreign taxes, paid residence countries which levied
income tax on the worldwide income of their residents, to source countries. In
addition, for investment income, that is, dividends, royalties and interests,
primary taxing rights were given to resident countries, while source countries
were allotted limited taxing rights. This category of income was regarded as
personal income and the primary taxing right exercisable by resident countries
over it was justified on the strong ties which resident countries have with the
assets generating the income.18
The source rule prescribed by the League in 1928 for the exercise of taxing
rights by source countries on the business incomes of non-resident enterprises
was affirmed in 1935.19 By the 1935 amendment, source countries could only
15 Ibid.
16 Picciotto supra note 8, at 25–26.
17 Ibid.
18 Supra note 14.
19 League of Nations, Article III (1) of the League of Nations Double Taxation Convention
(1935), available at: <www.uni-heidelberg.de/institute/fak2/mussgnug/historyoftaxdocuments/
normtexte/voelkerrecht/V00016.pdf>.
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exercise taxing rights over the business incomes of non-resident enterprises if
such income accrued from business activities carried on in source countries by
permanent establishments of the non-residents and are attributable to those
permanent establishments. The rule states as follows:
An enterprise having its fiscal domicile in one of the contracting states shall not be taxable
in another contracting state except in respect of income directly derived from sources
within its territory and, as such, allocable, in accordance with articles of this convention,
to a permanent establishment situate in such state.20
The significance of the allocation rules formulated by the League in 1928 lies in
the restriction of source-based taxing rights and the grant of exclusive or primary
taxing rights to residence countries.21 Brooks argues that the situation before the
adoption of tax treaties in the 1920s was, surprisingly, the reverse.22 She argues
that before the 1920s, source countries had the exclusive right to tax source
income, while residence countries provided tax credit for taxes paid by their
residents to source countries.23 According to Brooks, the rules changed in the
1920s because it became necessary to restrict the taxing rights of source countries
because developed countries had different rules regulating the exercise of taxing
rights by “source” and “residence” countries. Therefore, it was expedient to enact
uniform allocation rules to minimize incidences of double taxation, which could
hinder international investment.24 The preferred option was to restrict source-
based taxing rights, while granting residence countries exclusive primary taxing
rights.25 Brooks further submits that exclusive taxing rights to residence countries
was preferred because as at then, it was easy to determine where taxpayers were
resident than it was to determine the source of income being taxed. The third
reason Brooks cites is the Capital Export Neutrality principle, a subset of the
Equality canon of taxation, which states that individuals are to be taxed equitably
20 Ibid.
21 Charles Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 2 (1974), 292–316 at 293.
22 Kim Brooks, Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of International
Tax Revenue Allocation, 29 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, no. 2 (2009), 267–297 at
281–282.
23 Ibid.
24 See the Experts’ Report on Double Taxation to the League of Nations in 1923, available at:
<www.adc.library.usyd.edu.au/view?docId=split/law/xml-main-texts/brulegi-source-bibl-1.
xml&chunk.id=item-1&toc.id=item-1&database=&collection=&brand=default> at 42 and 51
where the experts state that the exemption of non-residents from income taxation in source
countries “is the most desirable practical method of avoiding the evils of double taxation and
should be adopted wherever countries feel in a position to do so”.
25 Ibid.
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irrespective of where their income is earned.26 These reasons seem valid when
examined through the lens of the need to harmonize individual allocation rules to
prevent double taxation. In addition, in the context of the function of income tax
as a tool for distributive justice among states, restrictive source-based taxing
rights had no negative effect on source countries during this period. This is
because they were all developed countries. As such, any contraction of revenue
that they suffered as source countries was easily made up for by the ability to tax
residents on their worldwide income, seeing that the income inflows between
them were equal, or nearly so.27 Restrictive source-based taxing rights, however,
do not have the same effect on source countries in the case of a tax treaty between
a developed country and a developing country. The reason is that the income
inflows are not equal between the countries. It is in this context that this paper
argues that the allocation rules that were formulated and applied by developed
countries in the early years, but are now being applied to developing countries,
create inequitable consequences for the latter and, to that extent, need to be
reformed.
Although, the League of Nations released model tax conventions after 1935,
the allocation rules established in 1928, which were amended in 1935, were
maintained in subsequent UN28 Model Tax Conventions.29 The next section
examines the OECD’s work on tax law harmonization.
2.1.1 The OECD and Tax Law Harmonization
The OECD, formerly the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation)
took over from the League of Nations concerning harmonization of international
taxation rules after the League became defunct in 1954.30 The prevention of
26 Peggy Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination: National Taxation in a
Globalizing World,” in Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceicao (ed.), The New Public Finance Responding
to Global Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 167 at 170.
27 Brooks supra note 22.
28 The United Nations replaced the League of Nations after the end of the Second World War,
in 1945, available at: <www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/>.
29 See the commentary and text on the London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions of 1943 and
1946. C.88.M.88.1946-II-A (Geneva, November 1946), available at: <www.biblio-archive.unog.
ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-88-M-88-1946-II-A_EN.pdf>.
30 The OEEC was formed in 1947 to administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall
Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, see OECD, Explorations in OEEC History
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009); see also OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and
Capital (Paris: OECD, 1963); Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy
for a New Era (California: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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double taxation with the goal to engender market reforms in the European
Community31 was a focal agenda pursued by the OEEC after World War II.32
Consequent upon the success recorded by the OEEC in reforming the European
Economic Community, it was redesigned as the OECD in 1961, with a wider
mandate to develop policies that would enhance the economic development of
member states, which, at this time, included non-European states.33 At this time,
investment flow had transcended the borders of developed countries and
extended to developing countries, and the OECD, desirous to maintain economic
ties with developing countries, designed a model double taxation convention to
serve both developed and developing countries. This was because the OECD
found that previous model tax conventions developed by the League of Nations
did not contain provisions suitable to the peculiar needs of developing countries.
The OECD notes as follows:
[T]he essential fact remains that tax conventions which capital-exporting countries have
found to be of value to improve trade and investment among themselves and which might
contribute in like ways to closer economic relations between developing and capital
exporting countries are not making sufficient contributions to that end … Existing treaties
between industrialized countries sometimes require the country of residence to give up
revenue. More often, however, it is the country of source which gives up revenue. Such a
pattern may not be equally appropriate in treaties between developing and industrialized
countries because income flows are largely from developing to industrialized countries and
the revenue sacrifice would be one-sided. But there are many provisions in existing tax
conventions that have a valid place in conventions between capital-exporting and devel-
oping countries too.34 (Emphasis mine)
Although, the OECD highlighted the failures of past model tax conventions as to
achieving fair division of taxing rights between developed and developing
countries, the allocation rules under the OECD Model (from the first model of
1977, to the current 2017 model)35 are, in pari materia, the rules prescribed by the
League in 1928 as modified in 1935.36 This then means that the observations by
the OECD that the allocation rules developed by the League were biased against
31 Ibid. The European Economic Community was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and
renamed as the “European Community” upon the formation of the European Union in 2003. The
EEC later ceased to exist upon its absorption into the present day European Union in 2009.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. Canada and the United States became members in 1961.
34 OECD, Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in Developing Countries: Report of the OECD
Fiscal Committee (Paris, 1965), para. 164.
35 Supra note 6. The OECD Model has gone through series of amendments beginning in 1977,
1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2014 and most recently, in 2017.
36 As outlined in Section 3 infra.
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source countries, still holds true. These historical developments reveal the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the allocation rules by the League
in 1928, and how the League affirmed these rules in subsequent Models. The
OECD copied these rules in 1963, and they remain unchanged until today.
The next section assesses in detail, the implications of the OECD’s restrictive
source-based taxing rights under Articles 7 and 10–13 on source countries, using
Nigeria as a case study.
3 Source-Based Taxing Rights under Article 7
of the OECD Model
Article 7 contains additional rules governing the exercise of taxing rights by
source countries. The foundational rules regarding division of taxing rights
among states is contained in Article 5. This provides that a source country can
exercise taxing rights over the profits of a non-resident enterprise where such
enterprise carries on business activities in the source country through a perma-
nent establishment.37 A permanent establishment is defined as “a fixed place of
business in which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”.38
The permanent establishment threshold is to “delineate the degree of contact a
non-resident enterprise carrying on business in a jurisdiction requires before it is
subject to tax there”.39 The term “permanent establishment” under the OECD
Model includes especially: a place of management; a branch; an office; a
factory; a workshop, a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of
extraction of natural resources. A building site or construction or installation
project constitutes a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve
months.40 The OECD Model removes temporary structures with no degree of
permanency to the situs from the definition of the term “permanent establish-
ment”. Structures maintained by non-resident enterprises in source countries for
storage, display of delivery, for purchasing goods, or for a preparatory or
37 Article 5(1) of the OECD Model supra note 6.
38 Ibid.
39 Kim Brooks, “Canada’s Evolving Tax Treaty Policy toward Low-Income Countries”, in Arthur
Cockfield (eds.), Globalization and its Tax Discontents: Tax Policies and International
Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010),
pp. 189–211, at 195–196.
40 Article 5(2) & (3) of the OECD Model supra note 6.
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auxiliary reason solely for the purpose of the enterprise, are excluded from the
definition of a permanent establishment.”41
3.1 Article 7: Background
Article 7 flows from the provisions of Article 5 and offers additional rules to
govern the exercise of taxing rights by source countries on business profits of
non-resident enterprises. This section analyses Article 7(1), which prescribes
the circumstances under which source countries can tax the business profits of
non-resident enterprises. I consider the implications of this rule on source
countries, using Nigeria as case study. Article 7(1) of the OECD Model provides
as follows:
Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent estab-
lishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that
are attributable to the permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 2 may be taxed in that other State.
The analysis of this provision begins with the OECD commentaries.42 The OECD
commentary to this paragraph reveals that two rules are subsumed under this
paragraph.43 The first rule states that unless an enterprise carries on business
activities in a source country through a permanent establishment, its profits are
not subject to tax in the source country. This first rule reiterates the rule under
Article 5, which exempts the profits of a non-resident enterprise from being
taxed by source countries in the absence of a permanent establishment. The
second rule is that the profits of an enterprise taxable in a source country are the
profits that are attributable to their permanent establishment. This second rule is
described in the commentary as the “attribution rule”.44
The summary of these two rules is that a source country cannot tax the
profits of a non-resident enterprise unless there exists substantial connection
41 Article 5(4) of the OECD Model supra note 6; see also Brooks supra note 39, 195–199 for a
detailed assessment of the restrictive definition of a “permanent establishment under” under
Article 5 of the OECD Model compared with the equivalent provision under the UN Model.
42 International instruments, which include double tax treaties, can be validly interpreted to
give meaning to their terms using commentaries to those instruments. See Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty, 1969; see also High Ault, The Role of the OECD
Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 22 Intertax (1994), 144.
43 OECD, Commentary on Article 7(1) of the OECD Model supra note 6, at 302, paragraph 1.
44 Ibid.
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between the income of such a non-resident enterprise and that country.45 The
“substantial connection” must be the accrual of taxable profits of the non-
resident enterprise from the activities carried on through its permanent estab-
lishment in a source country.46 The import of both rules subsumed under Article
7(1) is to limit the right of source countries to tax the business profits of non-
resident enterprises.47
A pertinent question that arises here in the context of the inter-nation equity
principle is the essence, and perhaps, the justification for the “permanent
establishment” principle in the OECD Model, seeing that it restricts source-
based taxing rights. Considering the history of the OECD Model, which shows
that the OECD adopted the allocation rules that were prescribed by the League in
the 1920s, I discuss below the raison d’etre for the adoption of the permanent
establishment principle by the League, before moving to argue in subsequent
sections how the principle in the OECD Model creates unfair consequences for
source countries in tax treaties between developed and developing countries,
and even in tax treaties between some developing countries. In discussing the
permanent establishment threshold, the following questions come to mind: If
fairness implies that countries be compensated for their contributions to income
derived from activities carried on within their jurisdictions, why is there a
qualification to the exercise of taxing rights if exercised legitimately? Put
another way, why is there an insistence on the existence and attribution of
business income of non-residents to a “fixed place of business”, which can be
easily dispensed with in light of technological developments,48 before source
countries can exercise their taxing rights under the OECD Model?
The permanent establishment principle was first found in the tax treaty
between Austria-Hungary and Prussia in 1899.49 The league adopted it in the
1920s as a mechanism to solve issues of double taxation that may arise when
source and residence countries concurrently exercise their taxing rights over
45 Mary C. Bennett, Carol A. Dunahoo Baker and LLP McKenzie, Washington The Attribution of
Profits to a Permanent Establishment: Issues and Recommendations, 33 Intertax, no. 2 (2005), 51.
46 Ibid.
47 Supra note 43, para. 14.
48 For instance, in e-commerce where economic activities are carried out over the internet
without the need for a ‘fixed place of business’ as prescribed under the OECD Model, See Arthur
Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits,
74 Tulane Law Review (1999), 133–217.
49 Arvid A. Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Boston: Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991), 65–101.
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corporations.50 To relieve double taxation, the League stated that source coun-
tries would have to give up their tax revenue from foreign investors except in
“pure and predominant origin assets, such as land and real estate”, which
translates to income from a fixed base in source jurisdictions,51 equivalent to
the definition of permanent establishment.52 Even though the League recognized
that this mechanism does violence to the interests of source countries where
investment inflows are unbalanced (in the sense that it prevents them from
reaping from their contributions to income produced from activities carried on
in their jurisdictions), it still recommended this approach as the most desirable
among the other options considered.53 Thus, the League chose to resolve the
efficiency problem of double taxation at the expense of distributive justice. The
League stated clearly that source countries were to bear the cost of relieving
double taxation.54 However, as argued above, this policy was justifiable as at the
time it was adopted because income flows among treaty countries were
balanced. In the context of modern treaties, however, source restricting provi-
sions create inequities for source countries. Before I assess the implications of
the permanent establishment principle on source countries, especially in double
tax treaties between developed and developing countries, and between devel-
oping countries in certain instances, I move next to establish how Articles 10–12
of the OECD Model also restrict source-based taxing rights.
3.1.1 Restrictive Source-Based Taxing Rights under Articles 10–12
of the OECD Model
Similar to the effect that Article 7 of the OECD Model has on source countries,
Articles 10–13 of the OECD Model present additional instances of source-based
50 Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation,
46 Duke Law Journal (1997), 1021–1110, 1088.
51 Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee – Economic and Financial
Commission Report by the Experts on Double Taxation – Document E.F.S.73. F.19 (April 5, 1923) –
Volume 4 Section 1: League of Nations, available at: <www.//adc.library.usyd.edu.au/view?
docId=split/law/xml-main-texts/brulegi-source-bibl-1.xml;collection=;database=;query=;brand=
default> at 49.
52 As outlined in Section 3 infra.
53 See p. 50 of the 1923 Report supra note 51 where the Experts stated as follows: “ … At the
present stage of our considerations, however, we do not see any other form of compromise
which is likely to reconcile the conflicting interests and to have any prospect of success …”.
54 Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee – Economic and Financial
Commission Report by the Experts on Double Taxation – Document E.F.S.73. F.19 (April 5, 1923) –
Volume 4 Section 1 supra note 51, at 40.
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restrictions. Article 10 restricts source taxation of dividends to 5% of the gross
amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner holds directly at least 25% of the
company paying the dividends throughout a 365-day period, and up to 15% of
the gross amount of the dividends in other instances. Article 11 restricts the
taxing rights of source countries over interest payments to 10% of the gross
amount of the interests. Article 12 totally forbids source countries from taxing
royalties.55
In general, several reasons have been adduced for the limitation placed on
the taxing rights of source countries under the OECD Model. Some of the reasons
are as follows: that source countries lack information about the overall activities
of non-resident enterprises needed to arrive at the taxable profits if the source-
based taxing right is expanded56; minimization of double or inappropriate
taxation; promotion of certainty to MNCs57; minimization of compliance bur-
dens; prevention of shift in tax revenues from residence countries to source
countries; and prevention of difficult and subjective tax treaty provisions.58
Interestingly, however, the consequences highlighted as reasons for the
restriction of source-based taxing rights exemplify the gaps in international
taxation. For instance, the challenge of double taxation, which was a major
reason for the enactment of the OECD Model, the UN Model and, indeed,
previous models by the League, still persists despite the attempts to fashion
viable methods to prevent double taxation such as the inclusion of the FTC
mechanism in these Models. The FTC was designed to be utilized by residents to
offset foreign taxes paid to source countries by corporations resident in their
countries.59 The problem of double taxation stems from the allocation rules
which only attempt to divide taxing rights over the profits of MNCs among states
in an order of priority of economic allegiance regarding the type of income, but
not to preclude states from taxing the income of MNCs either as source or
residence states. For instance, the exercise of a primary taxing right over the
business profits of non-residents by source countries does not preclude the
55 Supra note 6.
56 Ibid.
57 Some developed countries also raised this point in the discussion preceding the adoption of
the UN Model, See Paragraph 6 of the commentary on Article 7(1) of the UN Model, supra note 7,
at 142. See also Kim Brooks, Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income
Countries: A Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies 5 eJournal of Tax Research, no. 2
(2007), 168–197.
58 Ibid.
59 The FTC was first introduced by the United Kingdom in 1894 but later expanded in 1945 also
adopted by the US in 1918, see Graetz and O’Hear supra note 50, 1022–1109 for a detailed history
of the evolvement of the FTC mechanism.
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residence country from exercising residual taxing rights over the same income.60
Although tax treaties are binding on signatories, the lack of effective enforce-
ment mechanisms in international taxation is an incentive for states to dishon-
our their commitments. Kaufman sums up the current situation in the following
words: “More than a thousand bilateral income tax treaties in force around the
globe operate to minimize, but by no means eliminate, such double taxation”.61
The exercise of taxing rights by source and residence countries based on the
allocation rules is, therefore, deeply rooted in the notion of fiscal sovereignty,
which allows states to levy tax on their subjects, be it persons, property, or
business.62 The problem of double taxation of business income can only be
solved when tax is levied on the basis of economic nexus, that is, taxation of
income arising from economic activities carried on within a jurisdiction, rather
than on the sole basis of status, such as nationality/citizenship, place of incor-
poration or place of management. This does not imply that residence taxation
will not feature under this arrangement. What it means is that residence coun-
tries will only tax income that has some level of economic connection to
activities carried on within their jurisdictions. In addition to the economic
nexus rule, there is also the need for effective coordination of characterization
of income by tax treaty countries to avoid double taxation.63
In addition, the problem of lack of information on the global business of
MNCs raised by the OECD as a justification for non-expansion of source-based
taxing rights is a major challenge which nearly all countries face at present.
This is because MNCs carry on integrated businesses. As such, the statements
of the global business of an MNC remain relevant to effectively tax the profits
of related entities. This is the underlying reason for the OECD’s Country-by-
Country reporting Rules, which require MNCs caught by the provisions of the
rules to file with relevant tax authorities, reports detailing the operations of
60 Nancy B. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 Law & Pol’y Int’l
Bus (1997–1998), 145 at 147, citing United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
“International Income Taxation and Developing Countries” (1998).
61 Ibid, at 151.
62 J. Field, in State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, I5 Wall. (U. S) cited in Joseph H. Beale,
Jurisdiction to Tax, 32 Harvard Law Review, no. 6 (1919), 587–633 at 587.
63 See the Pierre Boluez v. Commissioner case (1984) 83 T.C. 584. In this case, the competent
authorities of the US and Germany could not reach a consensus on the characterization of Mr
Boulez’s income for tax purposes. The US insisted that the income arose from the performance
of services in the US, thus was taxable in the US. Germany, on the other hand, insisted that the
income were royalties, and therefore were only taxable in Germany based on the US-Germany
tax treaty.
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their global businesses.64 With the cooperation of all countries, it is believed
that the Country-by-Country Reporting Rules will achieve their intended objec-
tives but not without amendments to some key provisions.65
In summary, international tax problems exist at present even with the
restriction of source-based taxing rights under the OECD Model. The prevalence
of these challenges is proof that restrictive source-based taxing rights in tax
treaties do not resolve the problems in international taxation. Rather, what the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of tax treaties between developed
countries and most developing countries reveal is that the economic and poli-
tical strength of developed countries, which place them at a stronger bargaining
position, is likely a major factor behind the retention of restrictive source-based
taxing rights in tax treaties.66
The next section assesses in detail, the implications of Articles 7 and 10–12
of the OECD Model on source countries.
3.1.1.1 Articles 7(1) and 10-12 of the OECD Model: An Assessment
The critical point here is that the “permanent establishment test and attribution
rule” under Article 7(1) and the restrictions under Articles 10–12 of the OECD
Model have negative equity consequences. The first reason is that the permanent
establishment test and attribution rule preclude source countries from taxing the
business profits of non-resident enterprises made outside their permanent estab-
lishments within their jurisdictions. Second, the restrictions and total exemption
under Articles 10–12 allocate more taxing rights to residence countries without
any economic basis. To this end, the attribution rule under Article 7 and the
restrictions under Articles 10–12 violate the “inter-nation equity principle” which
ensures “equitable division of the tax revenue between countries”.67
This paper argues that since equitable division of taxing rights necessitates
fair allocation of benefits among countries based on their level of contributions
to activities generating such benefits, the allocation of taxing rights should be
64 Action Plan 13, OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing,
2013).
65 See Oladiwura A. Eyitayo, Profit Shifting by Canadian Multinational Corporations: Prospects
of Reversal under Canada’s Country-by-Country Reporting Rules, 26 Dalhousie Journal of Legal
Studies (2018), 79, available at: <www.//heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.jour
nals/dalhou26&div=7&id=&page=> for a discussion of the gaps in the OECD’s Country-by-
Country Reporting Rules.
66 Irish supra note 21, at 298–299.
67 Peggy B. Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), at 49; Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems (Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1969), at 238.
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based on the level of economic activities occurring within each country.68 This
approach will ensure that source countries’ contributions to all forms of eco-
nomic activities resulting in business income are adequately compensated
through the ability to levy income tax on those income in proportion to the
activities carried on within such jurisdictions.
Peggy Musgrave who developed the “inter-nation equity” principle, argues
that the issue of equitable division of tax revenue among the countries concerned
in the transactions of MNCs is an important question in international business
transactions.69 She notes that “international revenue sharing, as an aspect of the
taxation of foreign investment, is a matter of inter-nation equity … ”70 Musgrave
justifies the entitlement of source countries to tax income derived from business
activities carried on within their jurisdictions both by resident and non-resident
entities in the following words:
A country is expected to share in the gains of foreign-owned factors of production operat-
ing within its borders, gains that are generated in cooperation with its own inputs, whether
they be natural resources, an educated or low-cost workforce, or proximity to a market.71
The right of source countries to tax business profits of non-resident enterprises
“may be thought of as a national return to the leasing of these complementary
factors to non-resident investors or temporary workers”.72 In sum, Musgrave
links the entitlements of source countries to tax both the business and invest-
ment income of MNCs to the notion of sovereignty. This entitlement follows the
68 See Arthur Cockfield, Reforming the Permanent Establishment Principle through a
Quantitative Economic Presence Test, 38 Canadian Business Law Journal (2003), 400–422. In
this article, Cockfield argues for a replacement of the permanent establishment test with the
quantitative economic presence test. This approach would enable source countries to tax
income from all economic activities occurring within their jurisdictions even without the
existence of a fixed place of business.
69 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and
Arguments (Cambridge: Law School of Harvard University, 1969), at 130; see also Richard
Musgrave, “The Carter Commission Report” (1968), at pp. 180–181. Peggy and Richard
Musgrave also used the term “inter-nation equity” as the national gain or loss accruing to a
state upon the imposition of a tax in their article entitled “Inter-Nation Equity” in Modern Fiscal
Issues: Essays in Honour of Carl S. Shoup, 1972. Other scholars have also employed the term
“Inter-Nation Equity” in their works. see generally, Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The
Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax Value” for a review of
Peggy Musgrave’s works on “Inter-Nation Equity” for a detailed assessment of the use of the
term both by the Musgraves and other authors.
70 Peggy Musgrave Ibid, at 133.
71 Peggy Musgrave Supra note 26, at 172.
72 Musgrave supra note 26, at 168.
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capital-importing neutrality principle (the CIN principle) which states that a tax
system “should not distort the choice facing savers to invest at home or abroad”
and, thus, makes it possible for source countries to treat both domestic and
foreign investors in the same way.73 Musgrave describes the right of a source
country to tax all the income of non-residents arising within its borders as a
norm of inter-nation equity, distinct from the equitable right of a resident
country to tax its residents.74
What Articles 7(1) and 10–12 of the OECD Model do is deprive source
countries of their fair share of benefits that ought to compensate them for
their contributions to the activities of non-residents carried on in their jurisdic-
tions.75 This occurs when the economic activities performed by non-residents in
source countries do not fall within the definition of permanent establishment
under the OECD Model; when the income of non-residents cannot be attributed
73 Arthur Cockfield “Taxing Foreign Direct Investment in a Non-Cooperative Setting:
Contributions by Alex Easson”, in Arthur Cockfield (ed.), Globalization and its Tax
Discontents: Tax Policies and International Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 18–34 at 20; see also Thomas Rixen, The Political
Economy of International Tax Governance (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), at 62.
74 Supra note 70.
75 See Jalia Kangave, Taxing TWAIL: A Preliminary Inquiry into TWAIL’S Application to the
Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment, 10 International Community Law Review (2008), 389–
400. In this article, Kangave queries the import of Double Taxation Agreements in general in
facilitating development in third world countries. She argues that the inequality in the income
inflows between developed and developing countries due to immigration and financial con-
straints on the part of residents of developing countries lead to only the residents of developed
countries benefiting from the reduced rates under Double Taxation Agreements. Kangave also
argues that the exemptions in double taxation treaties between developed and developing
countries occasion revenue loss to developing countries, which ultimately, negatively, affect
third world peoples.
See also Martin Hearson and Jalia Kangave, A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and
Recommendations for Action, Institute of Development Studies, International Centre for Tax
and Development Working Paper (London, UK 2016), p. 50. Hearson and Kangave argue that
developing countries need to revisit their treaty networks in light of the findings that show that
tax treaties concluded between developing countries and developed countries have a strong
bias for residence taxation. For details about the interplay of political and economic factors in
negotiation of tax treaties between developed and developing countries, see Martin Hearson,
When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away their Corporate Tax Base? 30 Journal of
International Development, no. 2 (2018), 233–255; Martin Hearson, Measuring Tax Treaty
Negotiation Outcomes: The ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset Working Paper, Institute
of Development Studies, International Centre for Tax and Development (Brighton, UK, 2016),
p. 47; Martin Hearson, “The UK’s Tax Treaties with Developing Countries During the 1970s”, in
Peter Harris and Dominic de Cogan (eds.), Studies in the History of Tax Law (United Kingdom:
Hart Publishing, 2017).
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to permanent establishments; or through the limitation of source tax rates on
passive investment income. The inequitable consequences of Articles 7(1) and
10–12 of the OECD Model in tax treaties between developed and developing
countries is what this paper argues against.
As well, it must be emphasized that inter-nation equity is crucial in dividing
taxing rights among states where investment flow and income are not in bal-
ance. As Vann argues, where contracting states have the same or nearly the
same level of investment flow, even where source-based taxing rights are
restrictive, the expansive residence-based taxing rights will make up for the
imbalance.76 Vann considers extensively the implications of having restrictive
source-based taxing rights in double tax treaties. His observations are summed
up thus:
One of the important issues for international taxation is to effect a division of revenue
between two countries where income sourced in one country is derived by a resident of the
other country. This division has equity consequences as between nations. If investment
and income flows are in balance between two countries, it is possible to achieve a fair
division of tax revenue by giving greater emphasis to exclusive residence country taxation.
If the flows are not in balance, it is necessary to agree to a balance between residence and
source taxation to achieve a division of revenue that is acceptable (and fair) to both
countries.77
The quote above sums up the argument of this paper that the allocation rules in
tax treaties are biased against developing countries because the FDI inflows
between developed and developing countries are unbalanced. In other words,
the circumstances that should govern the division of taxing rights in tax treaties
between countries where investment flow is not at par ought to differ from those
regulating division of taxing rights between countries with equal or nearly equal
economic influence. The question raised by an assessment of Articles 7(1) and
10–12 turns on the similarity in the allocation rules which were developed for
developed countries by the League and the rules contained in the OECD Model
which are being applied to developing countries. Easson critiques the allocation
rules under the OECD Model as being “a more or less accidental result of the
attempt to eliminate double taxation … by major capital-exporting countries”78
He sums up his observations about the inadequacies of the rules in the following
words:
76 Vann Supra note 1.
77 Vann Supra note 1, at 7.
78 A.J. Easson, International Tax Reform and the Inter-Nation Allocation of Tax Revenue
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1991), at 20.
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… the present division has been a more or less accidental result of the attempt to eliminate
double taxation … since the principal architects of these model treaties have been the
major capital-exporting countries, it seems reasonable to suppose that, to the extent that
the existing arrangements are inequitable, they operate to the prejudice of countries that
are primarily importers of capital, and as the great majority of lesser-developed countries
fall into this category, there is the further consideration that some redistribution in favour
of source countries would on balance be desirable and would promote a form of vertical
equity among nations.79
The relationship between Nigeria as a source country with an insignificant
amount of investment outflow, compared to Britain, for instance, which is a
major emerging economy with massive investment outflows as the residence
country, exemplifies an unbalanced economic relationship. In this scenario,
inter-nation equity is jeopardized when Nigeria is prevented from exercising
taxing rights over profits derived by an enterprise resident in Britain from
business activities directly carried on by such an enterprise in Nigeria, such as
is the case in Nigeria’s Double Taxation Treaty with Britain.80 This position
79 Ibid. See also David Rosenbloom and Stanley Langbein, United States Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1981), 359 at 392–393. These authors
confirm that both the OECD and US Model Treaties are not designed for tax treaties between
developed and developing countries, and as such, impose substantial revenue burden on
developing countries. They argue as follows: “The OECD and US models are, as indicated
designed primarily for treaties between countries where the flows of income are roughly
reciprocal. The limitations of source taxation in those models produce a revenue cost for that
state. However, when investment flows are more or less reciprocal, the revenue sacrifices more
or less offset each other. In a treaty between a developed and a developed and a developing
country the flows are largely in one direction: income flows from the developing country to the
developed country. Thus, a model which is in form reciprocal in fact can impose a substantial
revenue burden on a developing country”; see also Irish supra note 21, at 298–299 who argues
that majority of the double taxation treaties with restrictive source-based taxing rights between
African countries and developed countries were “ … assumed by newly independent countries
as part of the general assumption of rights and obligations from the former colonial powers” but
see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization-Realities, Experiences and
Opportunities 56 Tax Law Review (2003), 259 at 307–308. Brauner, while arguing for the
OECD to take up the role of harmonizing international taxation rules, argues against the notion
that the OECD tax treaty Model benefits developed countries at the expense of developing
countries. He further argues that developing countries have never been forced to conclude
bilateral treaties with developed countries. Brauner’s argument appears to be conceptually
flawed on the grounds that the allocation rules in the OECD Model, as examined in the previous
section of this paper, obviously benefit developed countries more than developing countries.
Brauner’s argument also fails to consider political and economic factors that largely influence
the terms of tax treaties between developed and developing countries.
80 Article 7(1) of the Agreement Between The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
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equally applies under Nigeria’s Double Taxation Treaties with France, the
Netherlands and China, which mirror the allocation rule under Article 7(1) of
the OECD Model.81 The profits, which are exempt from being taxed in Nigeria,
become taxable in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and China, respectively, as
residence countries of MNCs concerned. In addition, restriction of source taxa-
tion is seen in Articles 10–12 of all the double taxation treaties that Nigeria has
with other countries. In this case as well, Nigeria cannot tax investment income
beyond the prescribed threshold even though the income arose from economic
activities carried on within Nigeria. This unfairness is what Kaufman reacts to by
stating that: “Inter nation equity is not concerned with the relation between the
individual taxpayer and the taxing sovereign … but is concerned with the one
sovereign’s competence to tax in relation to that of other sovereigns”.82
The argument that this paper makes against the restrictive source-based
taxing rights under the OECD Model goes beyond tax treaties between developed
and developing countries. It equally applies to tax treaties between developing
countries (for instance, Nigeria’s double tax treaty with China has restrictive
source-based taxing provisions under Articles 7 and 10–12), considering the
phenomenal investment outflows from emerging economies, the BRICS countries
particularly China, India and Brazil, into developed and developing countries.83
UNCTAD noted in 2014: “MNEs from developing economies alone invested $468
billion abroad, a twenty-three percent increase from the previous year. Their share
in global FDI reached a record thirty-five percent, up from thirteen per cent in
2007”.84 Although FDI outflows from Asia declined in 2016–2017, the recent
economic projections show that the region is still a major source of FDI world-
wide, accounting for nearly one-fourth of global outflows.85 Unfortunately, the
OECD has indicated its lack of interest in reforming the allocation rules by the
non-inclusion of this subject in its BEPS Project despite the fact that it was raised
by developing countries during regional consultations.86 As such, it is imperative
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital Gains, available at: <www.firs.gov.ng/Tax-Management/Pages/Tax->.
81 See Federal Inland Revenue Service, Tax Treaties, available at: <www.firs.gov.ng/Tax-
Management/Pages/Tax-Treaties.aspx>.
82 Kaufman supra note 60, at 198.
83 UNCTAD, Reforming International Investment Governance, World Investment Report (2015),
at 6.
84 Ibid., see also Vann supra note 1, at 14–15.
85 UNCTAD, Investment and New Industrial Policies, World Investment Report (2018), at 48.
86 See OECD, Part 2 of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in
Low Income Countries (2014), available at: <http://www.oecd.org/tax/part-1-of-report-to-g20-
dwg-on-the-impact-of-beps-in-low-income-countries.pdf> see also Irene Burgers and Mosquera
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for Nigeria to assess its treaty networks with both developed and developing
countries, and to begin to consider how it can maximise the revenue potential
of its tax treaties by renegotiating source-restricting provisions.
It is often argued that developing countries, as source countries, derive
benefits other than maximization of tax revenues from double taxation trea-
ties.87 These benefits are often said to accrue from FDI as the harbinger of capital
and technology flows to them.88 Perhaps, this same reason accounts for liberal-
ization of trade regulations in Nigeria, both through several amendments to
Nigeria’s laws, and through provisions in double tax treaties encouraging FDI.89
Even so, reports show that tax incentives are largely ineffective in attracting and
sustaining FDI in developing countries because of other factors, such as poor
infrastructure, macroeconomic instability, unclear property rights, weak govern-
ance or judicial systems.90 Therefore, Nigeria’s tax policy, focused on tax incen-
tives as the means of attracting FDI, is counterproductive in light of these other
factors. It is important to stress this, given that at this point, Nigeria’s tax
contribution to its GDP is one of the lowest in the world, standing at 5.1%.91
Beyond the FDI argument, therefore, is the need to modify the allocation rules
under Nigeria’s tax treaties that are based on the OECD Model to reflect the
“inter-nation” equity rule and to compensate for activities carried on in Nigeria
by non-resident enterprises either directly or indirectly.
The desire to transition from oil dependency to taxation as a means to
finance sustainable development must be coupled with actual commitments.
By way of recommendation, Nigeria should consider the source-expanding
Valderrama and Irma Johanna, Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A Fair Slice for Developing
Countries? 10 Erasmus Law Review, no. 1 (2017). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3026299>.
87 Eric Neumayer, Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries? 43 Journal of Development Studies, no. 8 (2007), 1501–1519.
88 Ibid.
89 Kunle M. Adeleke et al., Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Nigeria Economic Growth, 4
International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, no. 8 (2014), 234–242.
90 See the Report submitted to the G20 Development Working Group by the IMF, OECD, UN
and World Bank “Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax
Incentives for Investment” (2015). See also Fabian Barthel et al., “The Relationship between
Double Taxation Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment”, in M. Lang (ed.), Tax Treaties:
Views from The Bridge – Building Bridges between Law and Economics (Amsterdam: IBFD,
2010), at 3–18; See also Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct
Investment, 33 Economic Analysis and Policy, no. 2 (2003), 251–273.
91 IMF, Mobilizing Tax Revenues in Nigeria: Options for Revenue Mobilization in Nigeria, IMF
Country Report Working Paper No. 18/64, March 2018.
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provisions contained in the recent amendments to the OECD Model.92 These
amendments include the addition to the introduction to tax treaties, that their
purpose is to eliminate tax avoidance; the expansion of the permanent establish-
ment status to include a person who habitually concludes contracts, or habi-
tually plays the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts; and the
addition of the limitation-on-benefits rule, anti-abuse rule for permanent estab-
lishments situated in third states, and a “principal purpose” test to discourage
treaty shopping.
These amendments are the outcomes of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) Project.93 Although they do not radically expand source-based
taxing rights, they can deliver increased revenue to Nigeria through taxation.
Ultimately, there needs to be an expansive reform of Nigeria’s tax treaties
beyond the OECD amendments.
The source-based taxing right is expanded under the UN Model as exempli-
fied by the Canada-Nigeria Double Taxation Treaty.94 It presents an alternative
to the OECD’s restrictive source-based rules, in a way. In the next section, I
assess the source-expanding provisions of the treaty in the context of the
implications that its provisions have on source countries, using Nigeria as case
study.
4 The United Nations and Tax Law Harmonization
The UN’s ambition for promoting the inflow of FDI to developing countries and
to maximize domestic resource mobilisation “on conditions which are politically
acceptable as well as economically and socially beneficial”, sums up the ratio-
nale behind the UN Model.95 Piqued by the situation under the OECD’s mechan-
ism where the allocation rules gave more taxing rights to residence/developed
countries, the UN asked a group of experts in 1968 to design a suitable mechan-
ism to promote the interests of developing countries. In 1979 and 1980 respec-
tively, the UN released the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties
92 OECD, 2017 Update To The OECD Model Tax Convention, available at: <www.oecd.org/ctp/
treaties/2017-update-model-tax-convention.pdf>.
93 OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/>.
94 Canada-Nigeria Tax Treaty, available at: <http://internationaltaxtreaty.com/download/
Canada/DTC/Canada-Nigeria-DTC-Aug-1992.pdf>.
95 Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens, The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development and
Protecting the Tax Base, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series no. (2014) – 03.
Available at SSRN: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2398438>.
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between Developed and Developing Countries96 and the United Nations Model
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries.97 The
UN adopted these instruments to serve as models for tax treaties between
developed and developing countries. But it relied on the OECD’s 1963 Model,
which consolidated the works of the previous Models to serve its objective. It
recognized that as much as the promotion of investment inflow into developing
countries depended on the investment climate guaranteeing safe terms for non-
resident enterprises, it was equally important to consider the overall implica-
tions of these terms on the economy of source countries. To this end, the UN
identified the shortcomings of the allocation rules under the OECD Model, and
sought to address them through the design of the UN Model in 1980. The UN
Model has been revised thrice, first in 1999, second in 2010 and most recently in
2017. The next section examines the extent to which the allocation rules under
the UN Model promote source-based taxing rights, using the Canada-Nigeria
Double Taxation as illustrations.
4.1 Source-Based Taxing Rights under the Canada-Nigeria
Double Taxation Treaty
4.1.1 Background
Source-based taxing rights take a different form under Article 7 of the Canada-
Nigeria Double Taxation Treaty (the Treaty): the provision expands source-based
taxing rights. These rules flow from Article 5 of the Treaty, which prescribes the
threshold that should be maintained by a non-resident in a source country
before the source country can legitimately tax the profits of the non-resident, a
requirement referred to as the “effectively connected rule” in international tax.98
Article 5 of the Treaty departs from the equivalent provision under the OECD
Model by relaxing the degree of contact required by the rules for fulfilling the
permanent establishment threshold, which is the condition precedent for the
exercise of taxing rights by a source country. For instance, the amount of time
required for a building site, construction, assembly project or supervisory
96 United Nations, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and
Developing Countries (2003).
97 Supra note 7.
98 Jinyan Li, Taxation of Non-Residents on Business Profits, United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs Working Paper No. 5-A (2013), 12.
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activities to be held to establish business permanency has been reduced to three
months from the twelve months required under the OECD Model.99
4.1.1.1 Article 7 of the Canada-Nigeria Double Taxation Treaty: Analysis
The source-based taxing right is specifically governed by paragraphs 1 and 3 of
Article 7 of the Treaty. These provisions form the focal point of assessment here.
Paragraph 1 prescribes the rules governing the amount of profit of a non-resident
enterprise that is taxable in a source country, while paragraph 3 adds to the
rules in paragraph 1 to provide for allowable and non-allowable deductions that
can be made from accounts of permanent establishments in the form of
expenses. The background on the provisions of Article 7 given above sums up
the goals of paragraphs 1 and 3. It is instructive, however, to highlight the
commentaries to the equivalent provisions in the UN Model to demonstrate the
significance of the expansive source-based rules under Article 7 of the Treaty. In
the meantime, Article 7(1) of the Canada-Nigeria Treaty provides as follows:
The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless
the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent
establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on or has carried on business as
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of
them as is attributable to:
(a) That permanent establishment;
(b) Sales in the other State of the same or similar property or merchandise as that sold
through that permanent establishment; or
(c) Other business activities of the same or similar nature as those carried on in that other
State through that permanent establishment.
First, it is important to stress that Article 7(1) upholds the permanent establish-
ment threshold required for the exercise of the taxing rights by source coun-
tries.100 Article 7(1) of the Canada-Nigeria Treaty, however, deviates from its
equivalent provision under the OECD Model by increasing the amount of profits
made by a non-resident enterprise in a source country, which become subject to
tax therein.
Canada’s Tax Treaty with Nigeria is one out of the six tax treaties, which
Canada has with low-income countries containing this increase.101 This increase
is termed the “limited force of attraction rule”, introduced by the UN in 1980 and
99 Similar provision exists in Canada’s Double Taxation Treaty with Algeria, see Brooks supra
note 39, at 196.
100 Brooks supra note 39, at 195.
101 Brooks supra note 39, at 199.
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retained under the current UN Model. This rule includes profits derived by a
non-resident enterprise outside of the profits derived by the permanent estab-
lishment of such a non-resident from sales or similar activities in a source
country as taxable by such source country. The UN commentary to paragraph
1 of Article 7 explains that the “limited force of attraction” rule only applies to
business profits covered by Article 7, and not investment income such as
dividends, interests and royalties.102 It is also important to note that this rule
applies to profits derived from sales activities and other similar activities, but
excludes purchase activities.103 The commentary further highlights the circum-
stances surrounding the emergence of the “limited force of attraction” rule. The
rule emerged as a form of anti-avoidance measure to prevent profits derived by
non-resident enterprises from source countries from escaping tax therein. The
commentary highlights the concerns raised by some developing countries about
the administrative challenge they face under the OECD’s attribution rule in
associating the profits of non-resident enterprises to business activities being
carried on by permanent establishments of such enterprises within their jurisdic-
tions. However, developed countries argued against the introduction of the
“limited force of attraction” rule by reiterating their reasons for justifying the
restrictive source-based taxing rights under the OECD Model.104 Their emphasis
is the need to avoid uncertainty to taxpayers. Overall, the arguments by the
developing countries trumped those by the developed countries as evidenced by
the introduction of the “limited force of attraction” rule.
This modification to the source-based taxing rights under the UN Model in a
significant way affirms the “inter-nation equity” principle. The UN sidestepped
the emphasis placed by the OECD Model on the “permanent establishment”
threshold as a condition precedent for exercising taxing rights by source coun-
tries. It rather focused on the substance of the transactions which occurred in
source countries and for which those countries became entitled to tax their
profits. This benefit would have been lost to the restrictive source-based taxing
right under the OECD Model but for the expansion introduced under the UN
Model, which the Treaty incorporates as Article 7(1).
The tax base of source countries is also expanded through the limitations
placed on deductions that can be made from the accounts of permanent estab-
lishments under Article 7(3) of the Treaty, which provides as follows:
102 See UN Commentary on Article 7(1) of the UN Model Supra note 7.
103 See Articles 5(3) (d) and 7(4) of the UN Model supra note 7.
104 Supra note 57.
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In the determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as
deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the business of the permanent
establishment including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred,
whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.
However, no such deduction shall be allowed in respect of amounts, if any, paid (other-
wise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses) by the permanent establishment to
the head office of the enterprise or any of its other offices, by way of royalties, fees or other
similar payments in return for the use of patents or other rights, or by way of commission,
for specific services performed or for management, or, except in the case of a banking
enterprise, by way of interest on monies lent to the permanent establishment. Likewise, no
account shall be taken, in the determination of the profits of a permanent establishment,
for amounts charged (otherwise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses), by the
permanent establishment to the head office of the enterprise or any of its other offices, by
way of royalties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use of patents or other
rights, or by way of commission for specific services performed or for management, or,
except in the case of a banking enterprise, by way of interest on monies lent to the head
office of the enterprise or any of its other offices.
The UN commentary reveals the rationale for these detailed rules concerning
deductions from accounts of permanent establishments in source countries. The
commentary lists two reasons: as a form of assistance to other developing
countries not represented in the Group of Experts, and to make taxpayers fully
informed about their fiscal obligations.105
A combined reading of the text of this rule and the UN commentary reveals
that four rules are subsumed under this provision. The first rule is the allowance
of deductions to be made from the accounts of a permanent establishment in the
form of expenses incurred either within or outside the source country in per-
forming a function the direct purpose of which is to make sales of a specific
good or service and to realise a profit through a permanent establishment.106
The second rule is the proscription of deductions from the accounts of a
permanent establishment’s executive and administrative expenses at the head
office. This is premised on the fact that such deductions would overtly amount
to income stripping, given that other articles of the Convention allow to be
deducted by permanent establishments, the full costs of interest, royalties and
other expenses incurred by the head office on behalf of the permanent establish-
ment.107 The third rule deals with the allocation of costs/expenses for tangible
(semi-finished goods) and intangible goods and rights respectively, as well as
deductions for services by related entities. For this category of goods/rights, the
UN commentary provides that costs be allocated to the concerned entities based
105 UN commentary on Paragraph 3 of Article 7 supra note 7, at 151.
106 Ibid. at paras. 16–18.
107 Supra note 103, Para. 16.
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on the share of each entity.108 For services provided by an enterprise to perma-
nent establishments, the UN commentary also requires that the expenses be
allocated on an actual cost basis to the various parts as costs incurred and not to
represent profit to another part/entity of such an enterprise.109 The fourth rule is
the prohibition of deductions in the form of interests on loans charged by a head
office to its permanent establishment, save for financial institutions such as
banks. This prohibition is premised on both legal and economic grounds. The
legal standpoint is that the transfer of capital against payment of interest and an
undertaking to repay in full at the due date is a formal act incompatible with the
true legal nature of a permanent establishment, while the economic argument
against the prohibition is that internal debts and receivables may be arbitrarily
fixed.110 It is important to note that Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the UN Model
upholds the provision of Section 27 (g) and (h) of Nigeria’s Companies Income
Tax Act which disallow deductions of management fees as an expense charged
to the account of a permanent establishment in Nigeria.111
The import of these restrictions on deductions from the accounts of perma-
nent establishments is, ultimately, to boost the profits left to be taxed in source
countries.112 This provision is lacking under the OECD Model. Until 2010, the
OECD Model contained similar provisions on allowable deductions from the
accounts of a permanent establishment, limiting those to expenses actually
incurred by any such permanent establishment. However, the OECD deleted this
clause in 2010, and left the issue of deductibility of expenses to the consideration
of what unrelated entities would do in similar circumstances, that is, the arm’s
length principle.113
4.1.1.1.1 The UN Model only Expands Source-Based Taxing Rights in Part
Although the UN Model gives more taxing rights to source countries over the
income of non-residents, it does not entirely change the restrictions of source
taxing rights under the OECD Model. First, the UN Model, just like the OECD
Model, emphasizes the presence of a “fixed place of business” in source countries
before non-residents can be taxed on their business income. Although it is true
that the exercise of taxing rights by a state requires some connection between that
108 Ibid. at Paras. 33 and 34.
109 UN commentary on Para. 3 of Article 7 supra note 7, at Paragraph 35.
110 Ibid. at Paras. 41 and 42.
111 Section 27 (g) and (h) of Nigeria’s Companies Income Tax Act, Laws of Federation of
Nigeria, 2010.
112 Brooks supra note 39, at 200.
113 History of Article 7 (2) of the OECD Model Supra note 6, 47.
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state and the profit being taxed, the existence of a fixed place of business is not
the only proof that such connection exists. The implication is that the current
rules deliberately prevent source taxation of business income of non-residents
done outside of a fixed place of business.
Second, Articles 10–12 of the UN Model retain the same restrictions that exist
in the OECD Model over source taxation of passive income arising from activities
carried on in source countries.114 Although section 12 allows source countries to
tax royalty income paid to non-residents, Articles 10–12 of the UN Model fail to
specify the ratio for dividing taxing rights over passive income derived in source
countries between source and residence countries. By failing to provide a pre-
cedent for developing countries to follow, it leaves the ratio to the contracting
states.115 This open-ended approach is, however, dangerous, in light of the
economic and political disparities between developed and developing countries
which, of course play major roles when countries negotiate.
Altogether, the UN Model does not represent the best alternative to the
OECD Model in terms of the extent to which it reflects the inter-nation equity
principle. The UN Model is only a modest improvement on the OECD rules. The
flaws in the UN Model have led tax scholars to conclude that the UN Model is
not particularly different from the OECD Model. Sarcastically, Figueroa notes:
“After twelve years, in 1979, the ad hoc group of experts approved a model that
is known as the United Nations Model (the yellow book). Notwithstanding the
different colour of its cover, this model shows definite and clear similarities with
the OECD model”.116 Picciotto also notes:
The UN Guidelines did not make any new departure in the approach to tax treaties. They
took as their starting point the 1963 OECD draft, and merely noted the differing views
expressed by experts … . Neither the Guidelines, the Manual nor the Model treaty could be
said to challenge the basic principles of the OECD model. Although the report of the UN
experts stressed the primacy of taxation at source, this was not expressed in any general
principle … 117
For instance, auxiliary and short-term economic activities, and other economic
activities in general, that do not qualify as permanent establishments that are
114 See Articles 10–12 of the UN Model supra note 7, at 16–19.
115 Ibid.
116 A.H. Figueroa, Comprehensive Tax Treaties in Double Taxation Treaties between
Industrialised and Developing Countries: OECD and UN Models – a Comparison, Proceedings of
a Seminar held in Stockholm in 1990 during the 44th Congress of the International Fiscal
Association (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992), pp. 9–13.
117 See Picciotto supra note 8, at 56.
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carried on in source countries, which form part of the overall business profits
of non-resident enterprises, deserve to be taxed where they are earned. This
argument is embedded in the concept of economic allegiance which influenced
the development of the benefit principle that was used in formulating the
allocation rules as far back as in the 1920s.118 According to Schanz, who
developed the concept of economic allegiance, “a source country is entitled
to tax most of the income made within its borders”.119 The benefit principle
aims to compensate states for their contributions to all forms of income derived
from activities carried on in their jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the allocation
rules by the League of Nations were the exact opposite of Schanz’s idea.120 The
Committee rejected the benefit principle, and favoured the “ability to pay”
principle as the basis for dividing taxing rights between source and residence
countries. While the ability to pay principle is useful as the basis for income
redistribution nationally, by maintaining that individuals who earn higher
income should pay more taxes, it does not seem like the best approach to
allocating taxing rights between states. It is useful, nationally, as a tool to
ensure progressive taxation within states. However, on pure economic
grounds, it does not optimize the interests of either source or residence coun-
tries in profit allocation. The benefit principle seems more appropriate as the
basis for dividing taxing rights between countries, as it ensures that countries
are compensated for their actual contributions to the income of MNCs. An
example of how the allocation rules can compensate countries for their actual
contributions is through the introduction of a more flexible standard for the
exercise of taxing rights by source countries in a way that compensates source
countries for their contributions to all economic activities carried on within
their jurisdictions. This would also require a review of taxing rights that are
currently allocated to residence countries to ensure they are only compensated
for their actual contributions to the profits of resident enterprises.
The current allocation rules present an ironic situation of regressive redis-
tribution of revenue, that is, more revenue being allocated to developed countries
and less to developing countries.121 Tax waivers by developing countries acting as
source countries have been highlighted as a major source of revenue loss.
According to a report released by Action Aid in July 2015, three West African
Countries, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are losing up to $5.8 billion a year to
118 Michael Kobetsky, International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy
(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 114.
119 Kobestsky Ibid. citing Schanz, Zur Frage der Steuerpflicht p. 372 (Finanzarchiv 1892).
120 Ibid.
121 Irish supra note 21.
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corporate tax incentives. Nigeria’s loss is the greatest, estimated at $2.9 billion a
year.122 Another report by Action Aid in January 2016 revealed a higher amount
lost by Nigeria to oil giants Shell, Total and ENI in the value of $3.3billion.123
More than ever before, the increasing rate of poverty and hunger in Nigeria
is enough reason for Nigeria to pay attention to gaps in its tax treaties that
encourage revenue losses. The most practical way to do this would be for Nigeria
to also consider renegotiating its tax treaties, that are based on the UN Model to
include source-expanding provisions. The reform should consider source-
expanding provisions contained in the recent amendments to the UN Model.
These include: the addition to introduction to tax treaties that the purpose of tax
treaties is to eliminate tax avoidance; the expansion of the PE status to include a
person who habitually concludes contracts, or habitually plays the principal role
leading to the conclusion of contracts; the inclusion of Article 12A to provide for
source taxation of fees for technical services; the addition of gains from aliena-
tion of shares derived directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in
source jurisdictions; and the addition of the limitation-on-benefits rule, anti-
abuse rule for permanent establishments situated in third states, and a “princi-
pal purpose” test to discourage treaty shopping.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s goal in double taxation treaty matters should be to
advocate for global equality, which is guaranteed when revenues appropriately
belonging to the country are taxed in Nigeria.124 Improved tax revenue will be
guaranteed if Nigeria considers the reform of all its tax treaties. To that end,
there is the need for impact assessment of each of Nigeria’s tax treaties to ensure
that the level of benefits granted to non-residents is commensurate with the
corresponding gains derived. For instance, although the Canada-Nigeria treaty,
which is based on the UN Model expands source-taxing rights in part, the level
of FDI from Canada to Nigeria is minimal,125 unlike China or the United
122 Action Aid, “Use & Abuse of Corporate Tax Incentives in ECOWAS: The West African
Giveaway,” available at: <http://www.actionaid.org/publications/west-african-giveaway-use-
abuse-corporate-tax-incentives-ecowas>.
123 Action Aid, “Nigeria Loses $3.3b in Tax Revenue to Oil Companies,” available at: <https://
www.actionaid.org.uk/latest-news/actionaid-report-nigeria-lost-33-billion-in-tax-revenue-to-oil-
companies-money-that>.
124 Brooks supra note 57, at 169.
125 Although there is no data for foreign investment between Canada and Nigeria, report shows
that in 2017, Canadian direct investment in Africa was 0.6%, the lowest in all of Canada’s
foreign direct investment destinations. It was 61.2% in North America, 25.7% in Europe, 7.5% in
Asia and Oceania, 5.0% in South and Central America. Canada Parliament, Trade and
Investment: Direct Investment Between Canada and the World. Available at: <https://lop.parl.
ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/TradeAndInvestment/PDF/2018/2018-
503-e.pdf>.
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Kingdom. Studies have shown that the highest level of FDI in Africa is from
Western Europe and China.126 Unfortunately, Nigeria’s tax treaties with China
and Western European countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and the
Netherlands are based on the OECD Model.
Ultimately, the journey to fairness in international taxation will begin when
countries accept the inequities in the current rules governing the allocation of
taxing rights, and they take one step further to rectify them. This will entail the
design of new rules that emphasize taxation of cross-border income based on
genuine economic activities. All of this suggests the need for lower PE thresh-
olds, expansive taxing rights for passive income derived from source countries,
and rules that capture the dynamic nature of e-commerce.
5 Conclusion and Recommendations
To conclude, two main points can be drawn from the arguments advanced in
this paper. First, the restrictive source-based taxing right is an infraction of the
inter-nation equity principle and thus, an injustice to developing countries.
Second, both the OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions contain restrictive
source-based taxing rights, although in varying proportions. Indeed, considering
the economic loss which the restrictive source-based taxing right causes to
developing countries, like Nigeria which I examined in this paper, the gaps in
the provisions of both the OECD and the UN Model that facilitate capital flight
from developing countries ought to form part of the agenda at international fora.
Although at present the OECD recognizes treaty abuse as a form of BEPS,127 the
issue of treaty abuse under the BEPS project is being tackled from the angle of
double non-taxation, that is, as shifting of profits from source jurisdictions to
low or no tax jurisdictions. In light of this also, it is necessary to expand the
definition of “treaty abuse” to include situations where profits which, otherwise,
would have become taxable in source countries, are being shifted to resident
countries based on the provisions of double tax treaties. Equally, although the
UN is discussing the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals in devel-
oping countries, there has been no discussion around the reform of the
126 Ronald Wall, Jos Maseland, Katharina Rochell and Mathias Spaliviero, The State of African
Cities 2018: The Geography of African Investment, United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-Habitat) (2018). Available at: <https://unhabitat.org/books/the-state-of-afri
can-cities-2018-the-geography-of-african-investment/>.
127 Action Plan 6, OECD supra note 64.
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allocation rules which would secure more tax revenue for developing countries
to aid, among others, their efforts to achieve those development goals.
This paper therefore recommends that Nigeria revisits its tax treaty network
to renegotiate and include in its tax treaties source-expanding provisions that
allow for taxation of income derived from economic activities carried out within
its territory.
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